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This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using
plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production
efficiency within two years after activism, and this improvement is concentrated in industries with
a high degree of product market competition. By following plants that were sold post-intervention
we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value.
Furthermore, our analyses demonstrate that measuring performance using the Compustat data is likely
to lead to a downward bias because target firms experiencing greater improvement post-intervention
are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database. Finally, consistent with recent work
in asset-pricing linking firm investment decisions and expected returns, we show how changes to target
firms’ productivity are associated with a decline in systemic risk, particularly in competitive industries.
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A growing literature on hedge fund activism identifies a significant stock price reaction (5-10 percent 
abnormal return) for targeted companies with the announcement of activism (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and 
Thomas (2008a), Klein and Zur (2009), Clifford (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009)). The range of 
short-term price impact is highly consistent across different studies and different markets.
1 The current 
literature on hedge fund activism, however, has not explicitly identified the underlying sources of value 
creation by hedge fund activists. As a result, little is known about the precise mechanism via which 
activists are able to increase shareholder value. In fact, opponents of hedge fund activism often blame 
hedge fund activists as “short-term focused” and “financial engineering oriented,”
2  denying  any 
meaningful real and long-term impact.   
The limitation of previous research is due both to the novelty of the topic, and hence the lack of a 
large sample of post-intervention data, as well as the restrictions of the Compustat database.  First, within 
two years of activists’ intervention, close to 20% of companies targeted by activists disappear from the 
Compustat database since they were either acquired or delisted, doubling the normal attrition rate of the 
Compustat universe.  As a result, researchers have not been able to assess the post-targeting performance 
based on an unbiased sample.  Second, commonly used operating measures such as return on assets (ROA) 
do not reveal the underlying channels of improvement. In particular, these standard performance 
measures cannot isolate improvement in the productivity of the going concerns, that is, production 
efficiency gains, from gains to capital reallocation that are due to divestiture of underperforming assets 
and refocusing.   
This paper addresses both of these important issues by exploring the longitudinal data of 
manufacturing establishments (i.e., plants) from the Census of Manufacturers (CMF) and the Annual 
Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) databases maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. By matching these 
plant observations to hedge fund activism events from 1994 to 2007, we examine the dynamics of 
production efficiency for firms targeted by activists, measured by total factor productivity (TFP), and the 
gains in efficiency due to the reallocation of target firms’ plants. 
The following key findings on the long-term real effect of hedge fund activism arise from our 
analyses. First, the productivity of plants owned by the target firms shows a “V”-shaped pattern around 
the year of the intervention. Two years prior to the intervention, the productivity of target firms’ plants is 
significantly higher than their control plants with similar size and age in a given industry and year. Target 
firms’ productivity deteriorates during the two years leading to the intervention to a level similar to that of 
                                                            
1 See Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) for a survey of these studies. 
2 See, for example, “Hedge Fund Activists Set to Comeback,” Financial Times, December 8, 2009.  
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the control plants, but then rebounds to the pre-activism level two years post-activism. Second, we find 
that this improvement in production efficiency associated with hedge fund activism is concentrated in 
industries where product market competition is more intense.  
Third, we document for the first time that there exists a positive “spillover effect” of activism on 
the industry peers of targeted plants. That is, plants that operate in an industry repeatedly targeted by 
hedge fund activists also experience a significant improvement in productivity even though they are not 
direct targets. Again, this spillover effect on industry peers is concentrated in relatively competitive 
industries. Fourth, we present evidence that one channel through which activists create value is by 
facilitating efficient reallocation of corporate assets. More specifically, prior to their sales, plants that are 
eventually sold exhibit lower productivity and profitability compared to plants in the control sample. 
However, after the sale, the plants experience greater improvement in the hands of the new owners, 
suggesting that hedge funds facilitate the matching to new owners who can operate the underperforming 
plants more efficiently. 
Overall, these results reveal that hedge fund activism leads to a significant improvement in the 
production efficiency and profitability for targeted firms, particularly in competitive industries. This 
evidence refutes the assertion that the effects of hedge fund activism are purely financial (such as 
extracting payouts to shareholders through leverage) as argued by some policy makers and popular press. 
Moreover, given that plant observations in our Census data are not subject to the attrition bias related to 
the public status of the parent firm (which is the case for firm observations in Compustat), our estimates 
of higher plant productivity for the targets of activism are more accurate than performance analyses based 
on Compustat. Furthermore, the positive externalities of activism on non-target industry peers indicate 
that estimates based on industry benchmarks are conservative. 
Last, we link the significant announcement return for activism and the improvement in underlying 
plant productivity to the change in the target firms’ systematic risk. In particular, building on recent 
economic theories linking firms’ operating efficiency to their expected rates of return, we test for a 
“discount-rate channel” which posits that higher efficiency brought about by activism leads to a 
predictable decline in systemic risk and a positive abnormal return. The loading on the Fama-French 
HML (“value”) factor of target stocks around the announcement of activism indeed exhibits an inverted 
“V”-shaped pattern, a mirror image of the pattern we find for the productivity of plants owned by the 
targets. Furthermore, consistent with our earlier findings regarding target plants’ productivity, this change 
in the factor loading is significant in the competitive industries but not in concentrated industries. Taken 
together, our study identifies both a “cash-flow channel” (efficiency gains) and a “discount-rate channel” 
(a decline in systematic risk) that account for positive abnormal returns at the announcement of activism.   
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We have thus far not discussed the effect of nonrandom selection of target firms by hedge funds 
on our estimation. Though we make an effort to control for observables such as plant age, size, and 
industry affiliation, some unobservable and omitted plant or firm characteristics may be correlated with 
both the decision to intervene and the targets’ future performance. It may also be argued that activists are 
able to anticipate significant industry-level shocks to the structure of the product market and thus 
anticipate the implications of such changes on target firms. The observed improvement in target firm’s 
performance post-intervention may therefore just reflect the consequences of these shocks independent of 
the presence of the activists. 
We believe that these concerns are justified although it is important to emphasize that the 
growing literature on activism has shown that many of the changes associated with hedge fund activism 
are unlikely to have occurred absent activists’ actions. First, certain changes in financial and governance 
polices (such as the significantly higher CEO turnover post-intervention documented by Brav et al. 
(2008a)) tend to be the outcomes of confrontation and thus are unlikely to have occurred but for the 
commitment of activists. Second, previous work (e.g., Brav et al. (2008a)) has established that activists 
tend to hold on to a concentrated equity stake in the target firm until the resolution of their goals, a 
holding period that averages close to two years. It is hard to argue that activists would willingly hold 
undiversified positions and be subject to costly engagements (Gantchev (2011)) that typically evolve into 
shareholder proposals and proxy contests if these were not necessary means to achieve their goals. Third, 
openly hostile activism generates higher announcement returns than non-confrontational ones (Brav et al. 
(2008a), which in turn generates higher return than the revelation of large passive stakes (Klein and Zur 
(2009)). Hence, the market considers intervention necessary for value-enhancing changes. 
Overall, we believe that a careful interpretation of the evidence in this paper should balance the 
view that activists are able to anticipate and act upon changes that may have occurred anyway with the 
view that activists create value for shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, financial and 
operating performance of target firms.  At the very least, our results indicate that the positive returns to 
hedge fund activism should not be attributed to purely financial gains, but instead reflect anticipated 
improvement in the fundamental values of the targets.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the construction of the data and sample used in 
the analysis. In particular, we describe how we construct our measure of production efficiency and match 
the Census data to the hedge fund activism events data. Section 3 presents the main results of the paper on 
the real effect of activism on productivity of plants owned by the target firms. One focus of this section is 
the interactive effect of product market competition with corporate governance in the form of hedge fund 
activism. In Section 4 we document the extent to which hedge fund activists create value through efficient  
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reallocation of target firms’ assets by examining the dynamics of productivity of plants sold post-activism. 
This section also examines the extent to which the estimate of the real effect of activism based on 
Compustat is biased due to sample attrition from the database. Section 5 investigates the link between the 
onset of activism and subsequent change in plant productivity and the underlying systematic risk of target 
firms. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Data and Key Variables 
2.1 Data sources and sample construction 
2.1.1 Plant-level Data 
We obtain data on manufacturing establishments (i.e., plants) from two types of databases 
maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The first data source includes the Census of Manufacturers (CMF) 
and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) which provide plant-level information to compute our 
measures of productivity, profitability, and product market competition. The CMF covers all 
manufacturing plants in the U.S. with at least one employee for years ending ‘2’ or ‘7’ (the “Census 
years”), resulting in roughly 300,000 plants in each census. The ASM covers about 50,000 plants for the 
“non-Census years.” Plants with more than 250 employees are always included in the ASM, while those 
with fewer employees are randomly sampled with the probability increasing in size. Both the CMF and 
ASM provide operating information at the plant level including total value of shipments, capital stock and 
investment, labor hours, and material and energy costs. 
Compared to standard firm-level databases of public firms such as Compustat, the CMF and 
ASM have a few critical advantages for our analyses. First, since they cover plants owned by private 
firms as well as public firms, these databases allow us to track the performance of target firms even if 
they disappear from the database of public firms due to acquisitions or delistings. Since such events tend 
to occur more often among firms targeted by hedge fund activists this feature of the Census data helps us 
minimize the potential attrition bias in estimating the effect of activism (see Brav et al. (2010) for a 
discussion of this issue). Second, accurate estimation of productivity as well as industry benchmarking 
requires a reasonable uniformity of production functions, a property that applies to plants well but not 
necessarily at the firm level.  Thus, the CMF and ASM data allows us to identify the efficiency gain in the 
production process associated with activism as well as the effect of activism on a targeted industry, both 




The second data source is the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) from which we obtain 
unique longitudinal identifiers for plants and information on ownership changes. The LBD tracks more 
than five million (both manufacturing and non-manufacturing) establishments every year, essentially 
covering the entire U.S. economy. The variables available in the database include the number of 
employees, annual payroll, industry classifications, geographical location, and ownership status.  
We focus on manufacturing plant-year observations in the CMF and ASM from 1992 to 2007 (the 
last year of the data coverage), which is determined by the sample period of the hedge fund activism 
database (1994-2007) and the fact that we examine plant performance beginning two years prior to the 
intervention. We exclude ‘miscellaneous manufacturing industries’ (i.e., three-digit SIC=399) as this 
category does not represent a group of plants that share a common production function. We also require 
each plant observation to have variables necessary to estimate total factor productivity (TFP), including 
SIC codes, total value of shipments, production worker equivalent hours, beginning-year capital stock, 
and material and energy costs.
3  Appendix A provides details on the construction of these variables, 
including adjustments for changes in prices of inputs and outputs, and depreciation. This sample selection 
procedure yields 633,510 plant-years in our sample. 
 
2.1.2. Hedge Fund Activism Data 
The database of hedge fund activism events was collected by Brav et al. (2010) and Li and Xu 
(2010), covering the period of 1994-2007.
4  These events are identified mainly through Schedule 13D 
fillings to the SEC in which hedge funds disclose ownership exceeding 5% with intention to influence 
corporate control. We collect detailed information on key aspects of each event from the initial and 
amended 13D filings via the SEC’s EDGAR system, supplemented by news searches.   We refer the 
reader to Brav et al. (2010) for additional details on the data collection. 
The target firm-year pairs are then matched  to (potentially multiple) plant-year observations in 
the Census data using a bridge file between a firm identifier in the Census files and a unique public firm 
identifier created by the Census Bureau staff.  Panel A of Table 1 shows that for 305 activism events from 
1994 to 2007 (out of 2180 events in total), we are able to find at least one matched plant-year in the CMF 
and ASM data with adequate information for estimating TFP, resulting in 6,561 total number of plant-
                                                            
3 The ASM and CMF provide SIC codes until 2002 and provide NAICS codes only thereafter. We follow Giroud 
(2011) and impute the SIC codes after 2002 as follows. First, for plants that appear prior to 2002, we assume that the 
SIC code after 2002 is the same as the last available SIC code before 2002. Second, for plants that appear after 2002, 
we use a concordance table between the SIC and NAICS codes provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. Given that the 
concordance is not one-to-one, for NAICS codes with multiple potential SIC matches, we pick the SIC code with the 
largest employment share among the potential SIC codes, computed using the 2002 LBD data. 
4 We thank Yinghua Li and Jin Xu for generously sharing their hedge fund activism data for the period 1994-2000.    
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year observations. This match rate is somewhat lower than those typically reported in previous research 
due to two factors.
5  First, more than 70% of the hedge fund activism targets in our sample are in non-
manufacturing sectors.  Second, activism targets tend to be smaller than sample firms examined in 
previous research using the Census data (e.g., LBO and M&A targets). Indeed, the matching rate is much 
higher for the target firms in the manufacturing sector.
6 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that both the full sample of events and those matched to the Census 
data are more concentrated in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, consistent with the rise of activist 
intervention as a viable investment strategy among hedge funds from the early 2000s (Brav et al., 2008a, 
2008b). Given that not all of the targets of hedge fund activists are matched to the Census files it is 
necessary to examine if the matched activism events are representative of the entire sample.
7   The 
comparison of the distribution of stated objectives and success rates (including partial successes) between 
the full sample and matched sample, reported in Table 1 Panel C, indicates that the matched events appear 
to be very similar to the full sample of events. For example, the success rate (i.e., the proportion of events 
in which hedge funds at least partially attained their stated goals) for the matched sample is 50%, almost 
identical to that for the full sample. Given the similarities between the full and matched sample of 
activism events the results in this study are likely to be generalizable to the larger universe of hedge fund 
activism events. 
 
2.2 Key Variables 
2.2.1 Productivity 
Our main measure of plant performance is total factor productivity (TFP), which is defined as the 
difference between the actual and predicted output given inputs. In order to compute the predicted output 
for each plant, we follow the literature (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Lichtenberg (1992), Schoar 
(2002), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), and Giroud (2011)) and estimate a log-linear Cobb-Douglas 
production function using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions by three-digit SIC industry and year: 
ln                  
  ln           
  ln           
  ln            ,   (1) 
                                                            
5 For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) report a matching rate of about 50% for their LBO target firms with 
the Census data.   
6  Note that target firms classified as “non-manufacturing” based on the SIC code from Compustat might own 
manufacturing establishments, and thus could also be matched to the ASM and CMF data. 
7 We are in the process of collecting detailed information on hedge fund activism events from 1994 to 2000. We 
therefore perform this “representative analysis” for events from 2001 to 2007 only. We plan to update the analysis to 
include the pre-2001 events in the next draft of this paper.  
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where αjt is industry-year specific intercept, Yijt is output, Kijt is net capital stock, Lijt is labor input, Mijt 
represents material costs.  εijt is the residual and the estimate of the TFP for plant i, in industry j in year t. 
The coefficients in (1) carry (j,t) subscripts, which allows for factor intensities that are industry-year 
specific. In addition, given that TFP is the estimated residual of the industry-year specific regressions, we 
can interpret TFP of a given plant as a relative productivity rank of the plant within a given industry and 
year.  Finally, we “standardize” the TFP measure from (1) by dividing it by its cross-sectional standard 
deviation for a given industry-year. Essentially, this adjustment accounts for differences in the precision 
of TFP estimates among industry-years (following the practice of Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang 
(2010)).
8 
Since one of our goals is to examine the effect of activism on industry peers of the target firms 
(see Section 3.2), we compute industry-level TFP by estimating a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production 
function using OLS regressions at the three-digit SIC level for each year: 
ln               
  ln          
  ln         
  ln          ,    (2) 
This specification is very similar to that in equation (1), except that dependent and independent variables 
in the regression are aggregated at the industry level (indexed by j) as sums of plant-level variables. 
Similar to in equation (1), we take the residual of the OLS regression (εjt) as our estimate of TFP for each 
industry-year pair. 
As a complementary measure of performance, we also employ operating profit margin in our 
analysis, defined as total output minus material and labor costs divided by total output. More specifically, 
total output is total value of shipments plus the net increase in inventories (of both finished goods and 
work in progress), labor costs are total payroll, and material costs are costs of materials and parts plus 
energy costs, all adjusted for changes in prices. One advantage of this performance measure relative to 
TFP is that it does not rely on particular structural assumptions for production functions. In addition, it is 
comparable to the operating margin constructed using Compustat variables (except for the fact that our 
Census-based measure excludes overhead costs), allowing for a comparison of the results with those for 
the Compustat sample.  Unless otherwise specified, all potentially unbounded variables are winsorized at 
the 1% tail. 
 
                                                            
8 As Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) point out if each industry is perfectly competitive the constructed measure of 
output does not reflect pricing power and the TFP measure captures only production efficiencies. However, to the 
extent that the product market is not perfectly competitive, the measure of TFP could reflect pricing power or 
markup, as well as efficiency. However, as we show later, the gains in efficiency associated with activism are 
actually driven by target plants in competitive industries.  
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2.2.2 Product Market Competition 
Our main measure of the degree of product market competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Specifically, we compute the HHI using the Census data as follows:
9 
,              ∑     
    
           ( 3 )  
where HHIjt is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for industry j in year t, and S
2
fjt is the squared market 
share of firm f in industry j in year t. Market shares are measured using total value of shipments 
aggregated at the firm level (i.e., sales), and industry is defined at the three-digit SIC level. In our 
robustness checks in Section 3.3, we also compute the HHI based on an alternative industry classification 
scheme. 
While the HHI is well-articulated in the theory of industrial organization (see Tirole (1994)) and 
widely used in the empirical literature, we use industry net profit margin (or the “Lerner Index”) as an 
alternative measure of product market competition for robustness check.  Following Domowitz et al. 
(1986), the industry net profit margin for industry j in year t is computed as: 
         
∑                                
  
   
∑                 
  
   
 ,       ( 4 )  
where TVSijt is total value of shipments,  invijt is the net change in inventories, wageijt is total payroll 
(labor costs), and matijt is material costs for plant i in industry j in year t. Industry is defined at the three-
digit SIC code level. 
 
2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics comparing the characteristics of target plants and those of 
all plant-year observations used in our analysis. On average, plants owned by target firms have a total 
value of shipments (TVS) of $93m, real net capital stock of $44m, and total wage of  $14m (in 2005 
dollars), which are larger than the respective values for the full sample. Moreover, the workers in the 
target plants are paid more in terms of average wage per worker and hourly wage for production workers.  
In addition, the average firm in the target (full) sample operates seven (six) plants in its three-
digit SIC segment and 18 plants within the firm across segments. These statistics on firm size are 
                                                            
9  Since the CMF covers a much larger number of firms compared to that in a typical ASM sample, the HHI 
computed using the CMF tends to be significantly smaller than that using the ASM. We therefore compute the HHI 
using the ASM data only (rather than both the ASM and CMF data) and impute the previous year’s value of the HHI 
for the “Census years” for the consistency of the measure over years. Our results are robust qualitatively if we 




generally larger than those reported in previous research using the CMF and ASM databases (e.g., Schoar 
(2002), Giroud (2011)), which is not surprising given that our sample period begins in 1991 while those 
of previous research usually begin in an earlier year (e.g., 1977). 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
  Since our main measure of production efficiency, standardized TFP, is constructed as the residual 
of a production function regression scaled by its standard deviation, it has a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 0.90 by construction for the full sample (the SD is smaller than 1.00 due to the winsorization 
at 1% tails). In comparison, target plants have a positive mean TFP indicating that they are more 
productive than the average plant in the full sample. Similarly, target plants show a higher profit margin 
than the full sample of plants, on average. Finally, the HHI computed using all plant observations in the 
ASM database with a positive value of shipments has a mean of 0.04 and a standard deviation of 0.04. 
Notably, the mean HHI for target plants is larger than that for the full sample (0.052 vs. 0.040) indicating 
that hedge fund activists are more likely to target firms operating in concentrated industries. The mean 
HHI for our sample is much smaller than a commonly reported mean HHI of around 0.15 based on 
Compustat data because the Census data covers a wider range of firms including both private and public 
firms compared to Compustat which covers public firms only. In this sense, our measure of product 
market competition (HHI) based on the Census data is likely to be more accurate than measures computed 
using Compustat data. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for firms targeted by activists that are matched to the 
Census plant-level data as well as all target firms for the 1994-2007 period. First, Census-matched target 
firms are similar to all target firms in terms of size (measured by market equity and book assets) and 
leverage. However, targets matched with the Census data tend to hold less cash, pay less dividends, have 
lower valuation ratios (i.e., q), lower sales growth rates, spend less on R&D, and are more profitable than 
the full sample of activism target firms. These characteristics suggest that firms that are matched to the 
Census databases generally have worse growth opportunities but enjoy better cash flows. In addition, we 
note that these differences in firm characteristics should reflect the difference in industry composition 
between the two samples: A majority of the Census-matched firms are concentrated in the manufacturing 




3. Hedge Fund Activism, Productivity, and Product Market Competition 
3.1 Plant and Firm Level Analyses 
  As a first step, we examine the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms’ productivity and 
profitability at the plant level. Our main dependent variable is plant-level total factor productivity (TFP) 
computed as the estimated residual of a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function regression at the 
SIC three-digit industry-year level as in equation (1).
10  Our TFP measure can be understood as the 
relative productivity rank of a plant within its industry-year. Moreover, by construction, the TFP of an 
industry in a given year, averaged over all plants, is zero.  The second dependent variable is plant-level 
operating profit margin, defined as total output minus material and labor costs scaled by total output. The 
resulting regression specification is as follows: 
      ∑                                  
             .      ( 5 )  
  The key independent variables in equation (5) are a set of year-plant dummy variables, d[t-2], 
d[t-1], d[t], d[t+1], d[t+2], corresponding to plan-year observations from two years before to two years 
after a firm, to which the plant belongs to, is targeted by a hedge fund activist.  A plant is necessarily part 
of the target company during year t if the observation has d[t] equal to one.  Similarly, we require that the 
plant is owned by the target in year t+k, 0 < |k| ≤ 2 for d[t+k] to be coded one.  Hence this specification 
analyzes the dynamics of performance of plants that remain in the hands of the target companies before 
and after hedge fund targeting. Section 4 will separately examine the effects of ownership changes on 
productivity. 
Control variables include segment and firm size, measured by the log number of plants in a given 
industry segment of a given firm and the log number of all plants of a given firm, respectively. Plant age 
is defined as the number of years since a plant’s first appearance in the CMF or ASM database. The 
starting year is censored in 1972 when the coverage of Census databases begins.
11  This set of control 
variables is standard among research that analyzes plant-level performance using the CMF and ASM data 
(e.g., Schoar (2002), Giroud (2011)). 
Table 4 reports regression results at the plant-year level (columns 1 and 2) as well as at the firm 
level (columns 3 and 4). In columns 3 and 4, plant-level TFP is aggregated to the firm level using 
beginning-year capital stock as a weight and the number of plants per segment is the average across 
segments for a given firm. All four specifications in the table demonstrate a “V”-shaped dynamics of 
                                                            
10 While this specification is a standard in the literature (see e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Lichtenberg (1992), 
Schoar (2002), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Giroud (2011)), we also examine the robustness of our main 
results to an alternative specification (i.e., a translog functional form) in Section 3.3. 
11 The CMF database is also available in 1963 and 1967, but the ASM is not available in the “non-Census years” 
between 1964 and 1972. Hence, it is possible to track each plant continuously only from 1972 and onwards.  
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performance for plants owned by firms targeted by activists. That is, the productivity and profit margin of 
targets of hedge fund activism experience a deterioration prior to targeting and then rebound steadily 
afterwards. In particular, column 1 shows that the improvement in productivity from the year of targeting 
to two years afterwards is statistically significant at the 10% level. Column 2 shows that changes in 
operating margin are not significant at a conventional level. Firm-level changes in columns 3 and 4 are 
qualitatively similar to the plant-level changes, although the statistical significance is generally weaker for 
the firm-level results. The economic magnitude of the improvement in plant-level TFP due to activism is 
sizeable: a typical target plant experiences an increase in TFP of 0.056 from year t to year t+2, which 
amounts to 6.3% of the standard deviation (0.90). This pattern echoes the findings in Brav et al. (2008a) 
of improved performance at target firms after the intervention based on return on assets and profit margin 
as dependent variables. 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
  In addition, the positive coefficients on the targeting dummies suggest that plants owned by target 
firms are generally more productive and profitable than their industry-size-age matched peers, consistent 
with Brav et al.’s (2008a) finding that hedge funds tend to target mature firms with relatively strong cash 
flows but may be subject to agency problems of free cash flows.  These firms experience deterioration 
due to bad governance or mismanagement such as poor adaptation to market changes. The deterioration 
triggers activist targeting, and is more or less reversed within the two-year period post targeting.  The 
dynamics of plant-level productivity is hard evidence for changes in the fundamental value of firms 
associated with hedge fund targeting.  In addition, it refutes the assertion that the positive returns to hedge 
fund activism can be attributed solely to financial gains (such as extracting payouts to shareholders 
through leverage).
12  
A growing body of recent work highlights the interactive effects of product market competition 
and corporate governance.  Bauer, Braun, and Viehs (2010) show that lack of industry competition in 
combination with managerial entrenchment increases the likelihood of activist shareholder proposals.  
Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf’s (2010) theoretical model concludes that industry concentration affects 
the trade-offs of governance for shareholders.  Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) show that anti-takeover 
laws have a more negative impact on shareholder value in non-competitive industries; and relatedly, firms 
in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) governance index.     
                                                            
12 See, for example, “Hedge Fund Activists Set for Comeback,” Financial Times, December 8, 2009.  
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The body of work reviewed above has not uncovered the relation between product market 
competition and governance in the form of hedge fund activism. To this end, we extend the analysis in 
Table 4 to incorporate the interactive effects of product market competition, proxied by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of output value computed at the SIC three-digit level as described in equation (3).  
Results are reported in Table 5 where the interactive terms d[t+k] × HHI, -2 ≤ k ≤ 2 are added to the 
baseline regression. 
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
The key message of Table 5 is conveyed in the last six rows where we test whether the difference 
between the coefficients on d[t+2] and d[t], for example, and the differences between the interaction 
terms with HHI are significantly different from zero. The first difference captures the plant-level 
productivity and profitability gain in year t+2 over year t for the most competitive industries (where HHI 
is close to zero).  For the target firms in the most competitive industries, production efficiency and 
operating profitability improve by 0.100 and 0.010, respectively, in the two-year period post-activism 
compared to the level in the year of activism. The second difference assesses the slope of the first 
difference along varying levels of HHI. While not statistically significantly at a conventional level, these 
negative differences between dummies interacted with HHI indicate that the gain in plant performance 
deteriorates as industries become less competitive. In other words, hedge fund activism is more effective 
in competitive industries, suggesting that product market competition and corporate governance are 
complements in the context of hedge fund activism. The result for the difference between the coefficients 
on d[t+2] and d[t-1], and the difference between interaction terms with HHI shows a qualitatively similar 
pattern. 
One natural question that arises from this result is: Why do hedge fund activists target firms in 
non-competitive industries given that the effect of activism on productivity appears to generate 
insignificant efficiency gains? In fact, and perhaps surprisingly, we find that hedge funds are slightly 
more likely to target less competitive industries using Compustat as well as Census data (see also Giroud 
and Mueller (2011) for similar evidence). One possible explanation for this result is that hedge fund 
activists create value in different ways in competitive versus concentrated industries. In particular, Raith’s 
(2003) theoretical model shows that the benefit of improved efficiency (due to better governance or 
incentives) is higher in competitive industries in which the firm-level demand function is relatively elastic, 
and thus a marginal improvement in efficiency leads to a large increase in output and profits (“business 
stealing effect”). Therefore, activists might want to focus on improving productivity in competitive 
industries. In concentrated industries, however, the benefit of productivity gains is not as large due to  
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relatively inelastic demand curves, and so activist hedge funds could instead focus on financial and 
governance-related improvements.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that hedge fund activism leads to a larger increase in 
dividend payout, CEO turnover rates, and leverage ratios in concentrated industries compared to 
competitive industries (unreported). This evidence supports the view that in concentrated industries, 
activists  optimally focus on aspects of target firms other than production efficiency, such as capital 
structure and corporate governance. 
  Our results offer a different perspective on Giroud and Mueller (2010) who find that the passage 
of business combination laws (which delay takeovers) led to a larger drop in the operating performance of 
firms in non-competitive industries. While Giroud and Mueller (2010) support substitutability between 
competition and takeover pressure in mitigating managerial slack, we uncover a complementary effect 
between product market competition and governance in the form of hedge fund activism.  It is worth 
noting that theory in this context is ambiguous. For example, Hart’s (1983) model predicts an 
unambiguous complementary relation between competition and managerial slack, whereas the models of 
Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) suggest the possibility of both the complementarity and substitutability 
of industry competition and managerial incentives (i.e., governance). Therefore, this relation is ultimately 
an empirical question.  Our results indicate that efficiency gains due to good governance and incentives 
are more beneficial in more competitive industries, suggesting that the “business stealing effect” per 
Raith’s dominates.  Our findings also highlight the difference between control driven (e.g. takeovers) and 
non-control driven (e.g. activism) forms of governance, especially in their interaction with product market 
competition. 
 
3.2 The Industry Impact of Hedge Fund Activism 
  The previous section illustrates the differential effects of hedge fund activism on target firms 
sorted by the competitiveness of the industries that the target firms’ plants belong to. The analysis 
invariably benchmarks event firms against their industry peers in order to filter out the common shocks to 
an industry.  However, to the extent that the hedge funds’ impact spills over to the rest of the industry, the 
effect on the target firms that we find above might be under- (or over-) estimated if the spillover effect on 
non-target industry peers is positive (or negative), on average.  
  We therefore attempt to estimate the association between hedge fund activism and changes in 
industry-level productivity and profit margin, excluding the targets themselves, using the following 
regression specification:  
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  ,1 :2 1 , 2 , 3 , , , , j t t jt jt jt jt jt j t jt y TargetShare HHI TargetShare HHI Control                . (6)   
In equation (6), the unit of observation is the three-digit SIC industry (j) -year (t) pair, where 
plants belonging to firms targeted by activists in each year are excluded from their industry portfolios.  
For each activism industry-year, we track the changes in performance (productivity or profit margin) of 
the industry (excluding target companies) that the targets belong to from one year before to two years 
after the targeting.  The resulting  ,1 :2 j tt y    is the dependent variable. 
The independent variable of interest is  , j t TargetShare , a proxy for the intensity of hedge fund 
targeting in a given industry and year, defined as the market share (measured by sales in dollars) of 
companies targeted in year t in industry j.  Conditional on targeting, the market share of targeted 
companies in an average industry-year is 2.29%, with a standard deviation of 4.73%.  The unconditional 
(i.e., including industries with no hedge fund activist presence) mean is 0.25%. 
Following the discussion in Section 3.1, we further interact  , j t TargetShare with HHI, the industry 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of sales, to explore the effect of product market competition.  The control 
variables that we include which are common practice in the literature (Schoar (2002), Giroud (2011)) are 
the average segment and firm sizes (measured by the log mean numbers of plants per segment and firm, 
respectively), and the average plant age.  The exact specification of the control variables is not crucial 
since they are mostly insignificant in the regression.  Finally,  j  and  t   are industry and year fixed 
effects, respectively.  Results are reported in Table 6.   
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
  Columns 1 and 3 show a negligible effect of  , j t TargetShare on the performance of non-target 
industry peers.  That is, the presence of hedge fund activists in a given industry has no significant impact 
on the non-targeted companies unconditionally. However, interacting the market share of targeted 
companies with the product market competition yields a negative cross-sectional effect, which is 
significant at the 5% (10%) level using productivity (operating margin) as the dependent variable 
(tabulated in columns 2 and 4). This result indicates that the effect of hedge fund activism on non-targets 
in the same industry increases with the degree of product market competition. For example, the spillover 
effect increases more than two-fold when we move from the typical industry (0.509 = 1.238 - 18.232 × 
0.04, at the mean of HHI) to an industry that is one standard deviation (0.04) more competitive than the 
mean industry (1.238 = 1.238 - 18.232 × (0.04-0.04)).  
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  Relatedly, the coefficient on  , j t TargetShare  is significantly positive in the productivity regression 
with the interaction term with the HHI, revealing that the spillover effect on non-targets is increasing in 
the intensity of hedge fund targeting among the most competitive industries (where HHI is close to zero).  
This result echoes the previous result that supports a complementary relation between product market 
competition and governance in the form of hedge fund activism.  The same effect arises when we use 
operating margin as the dependent variable, although it is short of significance, possibly reflecting the 
difficulty to improve operating margin for a whole industry that is highly competitive.  In addition, the 
direct effect of HHI is significantly negative both in columns 2 and 4, consistent with the common 
understanding that competition promotes performance growth (see Nickell (1996) and references therein).  
  The results in Table 6 offer some new insights into those of Table 5, and into event studies of 
hedge fund activism based on industry benchmarks in general. To the extent that activism exerts 
disciplinary effects on untargeted peer firms in competitive industries, the overall impact on the targeted 
firms is larger than the estimated improvements benchmarked to their counterparts in the same industry.  
Our results also corroborate the study by Fos (2011) who finds that the mere increase in the likelihood of 
a proxy contest has a positive performance consequence for ex post non-targets. 
Anecdotes confirm this industry spillover view. In 2008 Wendy’s and Arby’s were pushed by 
Trian Fund Management to jettison underperforming brands and focus on better assets. Following these 
developments several other fast-food companies openly announced that they were seeking to reposition 
themselves. Notably Yum Brands Inc. sought to spin off its Long John Silver's and A&W All-American 
Food Restaurants in order to focus on Pizza Hut, Taco Bell and KFC.  Non-targets took such actions not 
only to preempt future attacks by activists, but also to compete with targets which were now presumably 
leaner and stronger (i.e., more efficient). 
In light of the results in Table 6, we should therefore view the estimates reported in Table 5 for 
the productivity gain of targeted companies in the most competitive industries as being conservative.  
 
3.3 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we examine the robustness of the baseline results demonstrating the impact of 
hedge fund activism on the productivity of plants owned by target firms as well as their non-target 
industry peers. First, we examine the robustness to an alternative specification of a production function to 
estimate TFP. In particular, we estimate the production function using a translog functional form that 
allows second-order terms of inputs including interactions between them. This specification is a 
generalization of the Cobb–Douglas production functional form used in our baseline model in equation (1)  
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and a second-order approximation to any arbitrary production function (Maksimovic et al., (2010)). 
Specifically, we estimate the following production function using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions by three-digit SIC industry and year: 
ln        
         
  ln           
  ln           
  ln           
   ln      ln        
   
   ln      ln            
   ln      ln            
   ln      ln        
   
   ln      ln            
   ln      ln             ,     (7) 
where αjt is industry-year specific intercept, Yijt is output, Kijt is net capital stock, Lijt is labor input, Mijt 
represents material costs, and εijt is the residual, and hence our estimate of TFP for plant i, in industry j in 
year t. 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the estimation results. The basic patterns that emerge from this panel 
are very similar to those from our baseline results in Tables 4 and 5. The productivity of target plants 
shows a “V”-shaped pattern around the year of hedge fund intervention, and this effect is more 
pronounced for more competitive industries. In particular, the increase in TFP from years t to t+2 is 
statistically significant at the 10% level in column 1. In addition, the economic magnitude of these results 
is comparable to that in Tables 4 and 5. For example, the TFP of target plants estimated using the translog 
(Cobb-Douglas) production function increases by 0.046 (0.055) unconditionally from years t-1 to t+2 in 
Table 4 (Table 7), and the slope of the interactive effect of HHI with activism on the change from t-1 to 
t+2 is also similar between Tables 5 and 7 (-0.983 vs. -0.710). 
Next, in Panel B we employ alternative measures of product market competition, in addition to 
the HHI for the three-digit SIC industry used in our main analysis. Specifically, we use a dummy for 
concentrated industries which is equal to one if an industry has a HHI larger than the third quartile and 
zero otherwise (column 1), the HHI computed at the Fama-French 48 industry level (column 2), and 
industry-level net profit margin (column 3). The results across all specifications confirm that our main 
results hold up using these alternative measures of industry competition. Focusing on the bottom six rows 
in columns 2 and 3, the improvement in TFP from year t to t+2 and from t-1 to t+2 are positive for nearly 
perfectly competitive industries (in which HHI or industry profit margin is close to zero). In addition, the 
improvement is significantly lower for more concentrated industries (the estimate for “(d[t+2] - d[t]) × 
Concentration” is negative in both of the specifications using HHI-FF48 and industry profit margin), 
although this interactive effect is only statistically significant (at the 10% level) when net profit margin is 
used to measure industry competition. Similarly, column 1 shows that the positive effect on productivity  
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is reduced in concentrated industries (e.g., the estimate for “(d[t+1] - d[t-1]) × Concentration” is negative, 
although not significant at a conventional level). In sum, these results indicate that our baseline results 
appear robust to an alternative production functional form and alternative measures of industry 
competition. 
Panel C of Table 7 employs the same alternative measures of industry competition examined in 
Panel B for the effect of activism on plants that operate in the same industry to which the targets belong 
but are not directly targeted by a hedge fund. The results in the panel are mixed. While the interactive 
effect of activism with the dummy for concentrated industries (i.e., with a HHI higher the third quartile) is 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels when the dependent variable is TFP and operating margin, 
respectively, the effect is insignificant when industry competition is measured using industry net profit 
margin. 
 
4. Capital Reallocation and Attrition Analyses 
4.1 Identifying Gains Due to Reallocation of Assets: Compustat versus the Census Data 
  To the extent that hedge fund activists help enhance production efficiency of the targeted firms 
(and industries), an equally important question is whether such improvements are accomplished through 
improving the efficiency of assets in place or through capital reallocation. In fact, efficient redeployment 
of capital is a commonly stated goal of activist hedge funds.  In addition to the events in which hedge 
funds explicitly demand sales of the entire target company (about 20% of the events), in another 15% of 
the events the activists push for the divestiture of under-performing or non-core assets in order to 
strengthen and refocus on the companies’ core lines of business.  Anecdotal evidence (such as the one 
referenced in Section 3.2) also points to capital reallocation as an important mechanism for the value 
added by the activist hedge funds. 
Prior literature has offered some indirect evidence for the extent of the gain from capital 
reallocation.  Brav et al. (2008a) and Greenwood and Schor (2009) show that announcement returns of 
hedge fund activism are largest among events in which the stated goal is to push the sale of the targets.  
Brav et al. (2008a) also document a significant positive correlation between target firms’ industry-
adjusted changes in assets and their industry-adjusted changes in ROA post intervention.  Both results 
suggest that activist hedge funds help create shareholder value through efficient reallocation of capital. 
  However, the analyses in the previous literature are limited by the scope of CRSP/Compustat data.  
First, performance measures computed using Compustat firm-level data do not isolate organic 
improvement (i.e., productivity gains of existing assets) from re-allocational gains (i.e., due to  
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acquisition/disposition of better/worse performing assets).  The Census data, which is recorded at the 
plant level and hence survives ownership changes and firm delisting, allows us to separate the two effects.  
Indeed, we show below that plants that change ownership post targeting (i.e., are spun off) performed 
worse than their industry peers one year prior to their sale, suggesting that hedge funds are effective at 
facilitating the divestiture of underperforming assets. 
  Second, a Compustat firm will drop out of the database if it is acquired by another company 
(public or private), or is delisted (i.e., going private).  Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) document a non-
random distribution of target firms’ attrition from the Compustat database:  Within two years after being 
targeted by hedge funds, 18.6% of the targets cease to be covered by Compustat (a proxy for delisting), a 
rate that almost doubles the average attrition rate of typical Compustat firm. Therefore, addressing the 
potential delisting bias is challenging, particularly given that the direction and magnitude of the bias is a 
priori unclear. 
Firm delisting is usually associated with negative reasons (Shumway (1997)). Accordingly, 
analyses based on the surviving sample tend to carry a positive bias.  However, such an intuition might 
not apply to the hedge fund activism target firms because attrition from the sample may actually represent 
a successful outcome for the following reasons.  First, targeted companies tend to have stronger 
fundamentals (higher productivity, ROA, and liquidity, as shown by Brav et al. (2008a) and Table 4 of 
this paper), and hence the subsequent attrition is less likely due to distress compared to firms delisted 
without the intervention of hedge fund activists.  Moreover, the “sale of the company” objective category 
experiences the highest attrition rate (31.0%), where the ex post sale of a target firm reflects a successful 
execution of the stated goal of the hedge fund.  In fact, using analyst coverage and trading liquidity as 
instruments, Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) uncover a negative survivorship bias due to delisting from 
Compustat. That is, firms that will experience greater improvement in performance post intervention are 
also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database conditional on observable characteristics. 
  The Census data allows us to pin down the direction and magnitude of the attrition bias by 
following targeted plants regardless of the listing status of the firms they are affiliated with.  The analyses 
that follow provide direct evidence consistent with a negative survivorship bias.  That is, plants belonging 
to firms that were delisted from Compustat post targeting experience greater productivity gains than those 
that remain in the database.  
 
4.2 Ownership Change of Plants 
  By focusing on plants that belong to targeted companies prior to activism but were later spun off, 
we attempt to identify gains in efficiency via asset redeployment facilitated by the activists.  In Table 8  
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Panel A, we re-run the regression presented in equation (5) but do not restrict the ownership of plants by 
the targeted companies in the two years before and after targeting.  Instead, the dummy variable di,t [t+k], 
k = -2, -1, +1, +2,  assumes the value of one as long as the plant is owned by the target company during 
the year of targeting (year t).  In contrast, the analysis in Table 4 requires the ownership of the plant by 
the target company in each of the years for the corresponding plant-year event dummy to be coded as one.   
[Insert Table 8 here.] 
  It is apparent from Panel A that the post-targeting performance change for these broadly defined 
event plants is worse than those reported in Table 4 for plants owned by target firms in each year from t-2 
to t+2. Specifically, plants owned by targeted firms in the year of activism show a deterioration in 
performance (measured by both TFP and operating margin) until one year after the intervention (i.e., t+1). 
The negative change from t-1 to t+1 is statistically significant at the 5% level for TFP.  The difference 
between the results in Table 4 and Table 8 Panel A is due to plants that are owned by the target 
companies in the year of targeting but were sold over the subsequent two years.  Thus, this contrast in 
results suggests that worse-performing plants were sold after hedge fund intervention.  However, to make 
the efficiency gain argument in favor of hedge fund intervention, one must also observe an improvement 
in the performance of sold plants in the hands of new owners.  To this end, we re-run the regression in 
equation (5) but redefine an event as the sale of a plant by a firm that was targeted by hedge fund activists 
in the year of activism or within two subsequent years (i.e., from t to t+2).  Usually an event of plant sale 
in this specification lags the corresponding event of hedge fund targeting by two years.  
  Table 8, Panel B shows that plants that are sold post-activism exhibit a sharp “V”-shaped pattern 
of performance around their sales. In particular, those plants had productivity that is statistically 
equivalent to that of their industry-size-age benchmarked peers two years before their sale, but were sold 
at their trough in terms of performance. Subsequently, both the efficiency and profitability of the plants 
experience a statistically and economically significant improvement in the hands of the new owners: The 
change in TFP (operating margin) from years t to t+2 is statistically significant at the 5% (1%) level, and 
this improvement is equivalent to 19% (36%) of its standard deviation. Taken together, the patterns in 
both panels of Table 8 are consistent with the view that firms divest underperforming assets after hedge 
funds’ intervention, and that the sold plants are passed along to owners who can operate them in a more 
efficient and profitable manner. These results help validate the stated goals of hedge funds in many 





4.3 Delisting from Compustat 
  Our Census sample includes plants belonging to 305 companies that were targeted by hedge 
funds between 1994 and 2007. Within this sample, 91 companies disappear from Compustat within two 
years after being targeted because they were sold, taken private, or liquidated.  Among this sample of 
attrition firms which posts challenges on any analyses using the Compustat data, we are able to follow 
191 plants owned by 53 firms that delisted from Compustat post-targeting. These additional observations 
from the Census data allow us to assess the sign as well as the magnitude of the attrition bias associated 
with using the Compustat data. 
 [Insert Table 9 here.] 
In Table 9, we report results from regressions that interact the dummy variables dit[t+k], -2 ≤ k ≤ 
2 with an indicator variable, Attrition (Non-attrition), which is equal to one if a plant belongs to a 
company targeted by hedge funds and then is delisted from (remains in) the Compustat database within 
two years afterwards. The bottom of the table reports the test for performance improvement among the 
plants of companies remaining in the Compustat database (e.g., H0:  (d[t+2] – d[t]) × Non-attrition) = 0). 
While the changes are generally positive, we cannot reject the hypotheses that there is no improvement 
from one year before targeting to two years post-targeting. Interestingly, when we focus on the plants that 
belong to companies that were delisted from Compustat during the two-year post-targeting period (e.g., 
H0:  (d[t+2] – d[t]) × Attrition) = 0), we find a significantly positive improvement at the 5% level. The 
economic magnitude of this change is significant compared to that for the non-attrition targets: The 
improvements in TFP and profit margin are four to five times larger for the attrition target plants than 
those for the non-attrition targets (e.g., the change in TFP from t to t+2 is 0.169 vs. 0.036).  
  The combination of the two tests for performance changes suggests an unusual negative 
survivorship bias. That is, restricting the measurement of performance to the sample of surviving firms in 
Compustat tends to underestimate the change in performance of target firms.  This result is consistent 
with the analysis of non-random attrition of hedge fund activism targets in Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010) 
using an instrumental variable approach.  Moreover, given this result, the performance (such as ROA) 
improvement documented in Brav et al. (2008a) and Klein and Zur (2009) should be viewed as a lower 
bound.   
  Needless to say, the Census data have their own attrition issues. About 35% of the plants that 
appear in our sample before hedge fund targeting disappear afterwards. There are two reasons for the 
attrition.  First, "small" plants (with fewer than 250 employees) are not sampled every year in the ASM 
(but, all operating plants are sampled in the CMF for the years ending ‘2’ and ‘7’) so that they might 
disappear from the sample (possibly temporarily), but in fact could still operate. Second, the plants that  
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are liquidated drop out of the sample simply because they cease to exist. The two-year attrition rate for 
target plants is 16%, while it is 27% for all other plants in the sample (i.e., control plants). This finding is 
consistent with the result in Section 3.2 that target plants tend to be larger, older, and more productive 
than the full sample of plants. 
 
5. Efficiency and Time Varying Systematic Risk Around Hedge Fund Activism 
The announcement of hedge fund activism, which is typically observed at the time hedge funds file a 
Schedule 13D with the SEC, leads to a large positive price reaction of approximately 6% (Brav et al. 
(2008), Klein and Zur (2009), Clifford (2008) and Greenwood and Schor (2009)). This revision in beliefs 
is consistent with the idea that market participants anticipate that intervention will benefit the target firm’s 
shareholders. This benefit, however, can accrue through two channels. The first – the “cash flow channel” 
- links the activist’s stated goals to the firm’s operating performance. The combined evidence from earlier 
work based on changes in operating profitability (Becht et al. (2009), Brav et al. (2008), Boyson and 
Mooradian (2007) and Clifford (2008)), and the more detailed plant-level analysis in the preceding 
section, is consistent with the market’s positive reaction to the intervention.
13  
  In this section we consider the possibility that the positive price reaction at the time the market 
learns of a new activist intervention reflects anticipated changes in future discount rates – a “discount rate 
channel.” Specifically, we ask whether the activist’s intervention is also associated with a decline in target 
firms’ systematic risk in the post-intervention period.  Here we lean on the idea that changes in firm 
investment decisions are linked to time-variation in expected rates of returns (Carlson, Fisher, and 
Giammarino (2004), Zhang (2005), Li, Livdan and Zhang (2009)). For example, Novy-Marx (2011) 
argues that the return premia earned by “value” firms relative to “growth” firms is driven by the former’s 
relative inefficiency as low margin producers and thus their higher sensitivity to negative economic 
shocks. To the extent that activists’ intervention leads to improved margins at underperforming target 
firms, we should observe a decline in expected rates of return post-event. Similarly, Imrohoroglu and 
Tuzel (2011) find that the annual return spread between high and low productivity firms is 6.3%. They 
conclude that low productivity firms that tend to be small value firms (as our target firms) with low asset 
                                                            
13 An alternative “cashflow” channel by which shareholders might benefit from activists’ actions is the potential 
wealth transfer from other stakeholders. Brav et al. (2008a) examine two important groups of stakeholders: creditors 
and senior management represented by the CEOs.  They find little evidence to support the view that shareholders of 
the target company gain at the expense of the creditors by increasing leverage and lowering the debt rating. Aslan 
and Maraachlian reach a similar conclusion. Brav et al. (2008a) do find support for the view that some of the 
positive price reaction may be driven by changes in governance that lead to better monitoring of senior management. 
They find that activists are successful in forcing out entrenched CEOs, reduce the pay of the ones that stay, and alter 
their compensation to have higher pay-for performance sensitivity.   
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growth and profitability, are riskier and thus command a risk premium. They propose a mechanism 
whereby low productivity firms bear higher costs relative to high productivity firms due to their inability 
to quickly adjust to negative aggregate shocks and thus have a lower valuation and higher expected return. 
Since the evidence that we have presented in section 3 is consistent with an increase in firm productivity 
post-activism the prediction from Imrohoroglu and Tuzel’s (2011) framework is that expected returns 
should decline post-activism. This is indeed what we observe below. 
  The analysis in section 3.1 shows that changes in firm efficiency occur predominantly in 
competitive industries. Indeed, Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2011)) find that for their sample of manufacturing 
firms their finding showing higher return premium for low versus high efficiency firms is much stronger 
in low concentration industries and turns insignificant in high concentration industries.
14 We therefore ask 
in the second part of this section whether the documented changes in systematic risk are concentrated in 
competitive industries as well. 
 
5.1 Changes in systematic risk 
  The empirical setup underlying our tests of the hypothesis that systematic risk declines in the 
post-activism period is based on changes in factor loadings estimated from calendar-time portfolio 
regressions around the Schedule 13D filing month.  We employ the full sample of 1,141 activism events 
over the period 2001-2007 and form four portfolios as follows. The first portfolio is formed by buying all 
firms that will be targeted by a hedge fund in three-year’s time and hold these target firm shares until one 
year prior to the activism. This portfolio is labeled as (-36, -13) in Table 10.  
[Insert Table 10 here.] 
A second portfolio, labeled (-12, -1), is formed by buying all firms that will be targeted by hedge funds in 
one year’s time and these target shares are held for eleven months up to one month prior to the targeting. 
The remaining two portfolios, (+1,+12) and (+13,+36) are formed similarly. For example, the portfolio 
with holding period (+1,+12) continually adds target firms that have had an activist event in the preceding 
month and holds these firms through a year after their respective activism events. For each of these four 
portfolios we estimate a regression of the portfolio excess returns on the Fama-French RMRF, SMB, and 
HML factors and the momentum factor, MOM.
15 We then focus on changes in the slopes on the risk 
factors and, in particular, the factor loading on HML, as evidence for possible changes in systematic risk. 
Clearly, all portfolios in the pre-event windows do not represent a tradable strategy. They are presented 
for an ex post analysis of the stock return patterns of target companies in the pre-targeting period. We 
                                                            
14 Private correspondence with the authors. 
15 We obtain these factor returns and monthly risk-free rates from Ken French’s web site at Dartmouth College.  
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present results in Panel A of Table 10 using four-factor models with equal and value-weighting of firms’ 
returns. “Alpha” is the estimate of the regression intercept. “BETA” is the factor loading on the market 
excess return (the Fama and French RMRF).  “SMB,” “HML,” and “MOM” are the estimates of factor 
loading on the Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, and the Carhart momentum factor, 
respectively. “R2” is the adjusted R2 from the regressions and “N” is the number of monthly observations. 
We set a minimum of ten firms per month for all portfolios. 
  Several key patterns emerge from the estimates reported in panel A. First, the positive factor 
loadings on both SMB and HML indicate that targeted companies commove with small value firms (Brav 
et al. (2008a)). Second, targeted firms underperform in the pre-event period. The negative alphas are large 
and significantly negative when we value-weight during the entire three-year period preceding the 
intervention. We observe lower magnitude of underperformance when we equal weight and only in the 
year preceding the activism. There is no abnormal return drift in the three-year post-event period 
(Schedule 13D filing or the first announcement of activism for non-13D events) consistent with an 
unbiased market reaction to the announcement of hedge fund activism. 
Third, the portfolios’ market beta and slopes on both SMB and MOM show little systematic 
variation moving from left to right across the four portfolio specifications. However, the factor loadings 
on HML show a clear “inverted-U” pattern. In the value-weight regressions the factor loading on HML 
for portfolio (-36, -13) is 0.203, reaching a high of 0.524 in the year preceding the intervention. The HML 
factor loading then decline to an insignificant low of 0.104 by three years post-intervention. The equal 
weight regressions yield a similar pattern although the highest HML slope of 0.636 is reached in the first 
year post-activism and then declines to an insignificant 0.158. The magnitude of this mean-reversion is 
economically large. The sample average annual return on the Fama and French HML portfolio over the 
period 1927-2010 is 4.9 percent and is only slightly lower at 4.6 percent for the most recent decade. 
Hence, a decline in slopes of roughly 0.3-0.4 translates into a decrease of 1.5% - 2% in the target firm 
expected annual rate of return – clearly, a large enough change that could drive some of the event-day 
price reactions. 
The preceding evidence is consistent with the idea that target firms turn more “value” prior to 
being targeted and by the time activists choose to intervene their sensitivity to the systematic variation in 
HML is close to its peak. This sensitivity then declines over the ensuing three years post-activism. 
However, it may very well be the case that these changes reflect the evolution of systematic risk that is 
shared by other non-target firms and thus perhaps is driven by non-activism related economic forces. To 
examine this possibility we next present in panel B tests that are designed to compare the dynamics of the 
HML slopes of targeted and non-targeted matched samples. We form two matched benchmark portfolios.  
 
25
The first is an industry benchmark formed by matching each target firm to one of the corresponding Fama 
and French 48 value-weight industry portfolios. The second is an industry, size, and book-to-market-
based benchmark portfolio.  
Consider first the Fama-French industry benchmark. To test whether the evolution of the factor 
loadings on HML mimic those of the corresponding industry we proceed as follows. For each of the four 
time frames considered earlier, (-36, -13), (-12, -1), (+1,+12) and (+13,+36), we form a zero-cost 
portfolio that is long in target firms and short in the industry benchmark portfolio. The long side of each 
of the zero-cost portfolios is just a portfolio that was used earlier in panel A. The short side is formed by 
first matching each target firm to one of the corresponding Fama and French 48 value-weight industry 
portfolios and then either equal- or value-weighting the benchmark industry returns. We test for 
differences in factor exposures between target firms and their respective industries by asking whether the 
estimates of the portfolios’ factor loadings are significantly different from zero. 
The evidence in panel B highlights several differences that are worth noting. First, target firms 
underperform relative to their industry in the period preceding the activism and as in panel A the 
underperformance is stronger in the value weight regressions. Second, target firms have a much higher 
exposure to SMB for all four portfolios.  This is of course not surprising given that targets are typically 
small firms (Brav et al. (2008a)) whereas our benchmark is a value-weight industry portfolio. We control 
for size differences with the characteristic-based benchmark below. Third, an examination of the slopes 
on HML shows that the inverted-U shape pattern observed in panel A is not driven by industry-wide 
effects. In the value-weight specification the factor loading is 0.114 and insignificant in the period (-36, -
13) but then peaks at 0.416 in the first year post-activism. The difference declines back to 0.157, a level 
similar to the one prior to the activism, in the post-event period (+13,+36) and remains significant. In the 
equal weight regressions we observe a similar pattern. Future targets have a higher loading of 0.226 on 
HML in the period (-36, -13) and this difference peaks at 0.658 in the first-year post-activism. We then 
see, again, a decline in the zero-cost portfolios’ exposure on HML to 0.225 – essentially the level 
observed at the outset in the period (-36, -13). 
Since the industry-wide benchmark does not control for firm specific characteristics that may 
better capture the time-variation in factor loading that we document, we next proceed in panel C and form 
zero-cost portfolios that are long in target firms and short in an industry and characteristic-based 
benchmark portfolio. The benchmark is formed by first matching each target firm with non-target 
replacement firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. We retain firms whose market capitalization is within 
50% of the target firm’s market capitalization. Next, we further narrow down the list of benchmark firms 
to those whose book-to-market ratio within 25% of the target firm’s book-to-market ratio, measured in the  
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year preceding the hedge fund activism. The last step is to value weight the remaining benchmark firms. 
As in panel B we form both equal- and value-weight zero-cost portfolios that are long in the target firms 
and short in the matched non-target firm returns. Panel C provides the calendar-time regression results. 
As before, we observe that target firms underperform relative to their benchmark in the pre-event 
period in the value-weight specification. The equal-weight regressions show little evidence of 
underperformance. In addition, the matching by market capitalization now generates no significant 
differences in loadings on SMB throughout the four periods we examine in both equal- and value-weight 
specifications. More notably, although we control for book-to-market, we can still observe how target 
firms’ slope on HML is significantly higher than the matched firms in the years before and after the 
targeting. This evidence suggests that target firms’ mean reversion in sensitivity to the information 
captured by HML contains a component that is not shared by other non-targets. This difference turns 
insignificant by the second and third year post-activism.  
 
5.2 Risk changes conditioned on the degree of product market competition 
  The results in Section 3.1 show that changes in firm efficiency occur predominantly in 
competitive industries. We now ask whether the changes in target firms’ systematic risk documented in 
the preceding section are also concentrated in competitive industries.
16  
[Insert Table 11 here.] 
  The estimation strategy mimics that in Table 10. However, we now also condition on the degree 
of competitiveness of the target firm’s industry using its Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”). The HHI 
index is formed as in the previous analysis at the 3-digit SIC level. Table 11 reports regression estimates 
from equal- and value-weighted calendar-time portfolio regressions by sorting target firms into 
“competitive” and “non-competitive” industries. An industry is classified as competitive (non-competitive) 
if its HHI index is lower (higher) than the 25th percentile of industry HHIs in a given year. HHI 
classifications are lagged by one year. The choice of this 25th percentile is driven by the need to have a 
sufficient number of observations in both portfolios, as we are now adding one more conditioning 
variable to our regressions. Panel A provides results for competitive industries (low HHI) while panel B 
provides results for targets in non-competitive industries (high HHI). Within each panel and weighting 
scheme we report target firm long only portfolio regression results and results in which we take a long 
position in a target firm portfolio and short a value-weight portfolio of benchmark firms formed by 
                                                            
16 Most theoretical work linking optimal firm investment and risk dynamics does not condition on the extent of 
industry concentration. An exception is Aguerrevere (2009). In his model, when demand is low, firms in more 
competitive industries earn higher returns since their assets in place are riskier than their growth options whereas 
when demand is high firms in more concentrated industries earn higher returns since their growth options are riskier.   
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matching based on 3-digit SIC code, size and book-to-market ratio as in panel C of Table 10. We set a 
minimum of ten firms per month for all portfolios. 
  Several key results are worth noting. First, similar to the result in Table 10, the underperformance 
of future targets is economically and statistically large in the value-weight regressions with little evidence 
of a drift post-event in both competitive and non-competitive industries. The equal-weight results, 
however, indicate that targets tend to outperform their matched benchmark firms in the pre-activism 
period only in competitive industries. Second, in the zero-cost regressions in which we go long in target 
firms and short the benchmark portfolio, the slopes on the market portfolio, SMB and MOM are 
economically small with no discernible pattern across the four time-periods both for competitive and non-
competitive industries. However, it can be seen that the inverted-U shape pattern on HML in these 
regressions is economically large and significant only when we consider the competitive industries in 
panel A. In the value weight regressions the zero-cost HML slope peaks at 0.526 in the year leading up to 
the activism and in the equal-weight specification the slope peaks at 0.478 in the first year post-activism, 
a pattern similar to that observed in the preceding table. The mean-reversion in HML slopes is hard to 
detect when we look at targets compared to their benchmark firms in non-competitive industries. The 
value-weight specification yields HML slopes that are all economically very small while in the equal-
weight regression we do see some degree of mean-reversion although all slopes on HML are insignificant. 
We conclude from this analysis that activism in competitive industries is fundamentally different 
than that in more concentrated industries as it is associated with both higher target firm efficiency and a 
decline in expected rate of return in the post-event period.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Using plant-level observations from the U.S. Census Bureau we show that hedge fund 
intervention is associated with both productivity and profitability gains at the plants of the targeted 
companies and that this effect is stronger in more competitive industries. This outperformance is notable 
since we find that benchmark plants, those managed by non-targeted peers in the competitive industries, 
share some of this improvement as well. We also measure the performance of plants that were sold 
subsequent to the intervention and find that they were among the worst performing at the time of 
divesture but later experience a substantial improvement in the hands of new owners relative to a matched 
sample. These results support the view that hedge fund activists facilitate improvements in terms of both 
production efficiency and capital re-allocation.   
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We also show how the use of Compustat data to measure the performance of targeted firms is 
likely to lead to a downward bias in estimates of performance since target firms that experience greater 
improvement in performance post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat 
database. Finally, we link the real effects to the target firms’ expected return by empirically testing 
whether the positive price reaction at the time of the announcement of activism reflects an anticipated 
decline in future discount rates, building on the idea that the target firm’s higher efficiency implies a 
decline in its sensitivity to negative economic shocks and thus lower systemic risk. Consistent with this 
view we find that target firms’ sensitivity to HML-related factor risk peaks around the time of 
intervention and then declines predictably to that of matched control firms. This mean reversion is, again, 
mostly concentrated in competitive industries. Overall, the evidence provided in the paper highlights the 
real and fundamental effects brought about by hedge fund activists to their target firms as well as their 
industry peers.  
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Appendix A – Construction of Variables to Estimate Production Function 
This appendix describes the construction of variables required to estimate the production function 
described in Section 2.2 using variables in the CMF and ASM databases. Output is computed as the sum 
of total value of shipments (TVS) and the net increase in inventories of finished goods and works in 
progress. To account for industry-level changes in output price, we deflate output using the four-digit SIC 
level output price deflator from the NBER-CES manufacturing database constructed by Bartelsman, 
Becker, and Gray (2000). 
Capital stock is constructed using a recursive perpetual inventory formula (Lichtenberg (1992), 
Kovneck and Phillips (1997)). First, we obtain the initial value of nominal capital stock for each plant 
when the plant is born (identified using the LBD) or first appears in the CMF or ASM. Second, we 
translate this initial historical value of gross capital stock into a constant value of net capital stock using a 
NAICS-based industry-level capital stock deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Third, 
we account for changes in the price of capital by deflating the computed real, net capital stock using the 
four-digit SIC level investment deflator from the NBER-CES manufacturing database. Fourth, beginning 
with the constructed initial net capital stock in constant dollars for each plant, we accumulate capital stock 
going forward using the following recursive formula: 
     	      	  1            ,       (A-1) 
where Kit is net capital stock, δit is a two-digit SIC level depreciation rate from the BEA, and Iit is 
investment for plant i in year t. The measure of investment is deflated using the four-digit SIC level 
investment deflator from the NBER-CES manufacturing database. Before 1997, variables for investment 
were available separately for equipment and structure, and we thus construct capital stock separately for 
each category and then sum the two capital stock measures to obtain total capital stock. After 1997, only 
variables for total capital are available, and so we only construct total capital stock. 
We use “production-worker equivalent hours” as our measure of labor input. Specifically, labor 
input is constructed as the total production worker hours times total wage bills divided by wage bills for 
production workers. The underlying assumption to construct this measure of labor hour is that the per-
hour wage rates for production and non-production workers are similar. Lastly, material costs are 
computed as the costs of materials and parts plus the costs of fuel and electricity. 
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Table 1: Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics on the Census-matched Sample 
Panel A shows the numbers of all hedge fund activism events and the events matched to the Census of 
Manufacturers (CMF) and Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) databases from 1994 to 2007, 
separately for manufacturing and non-manufacturing target firms based on the Compustat SIC code. The 
panel also shows the number of plant-year observations for the Census-matched events. Panel B breaks 
down the numbers of the Census data-matched events and plant-year observations, and all events by 
decade. Panel C shows the distribution of activists’ stated objectives, the percentage among the sample, 
and success rates for the full sample (columns 1-3) and the Census-matched sample (columns 4-6) of 
events from 2001 to 2007. Columns 1, 2 and 4, 5 report the number of events, and the percentage among 
all events, of each category. Columns 3 and 6 list the rate of success (including partial success). 
Percentages sum up to more than 100% since one event can have multiple objectives (However, the first 
category and the other four categories are mutually exclusive.) An event is classified as successful if the 
hedge fund achieves its main stated goal and a partial success if the hedge fund and the company reach 
some settlement through negotiation that partially meets the fund’s original goal. 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection for Activism Events Matched to Census Data from 1994 to 2007 
Events  Num. events  Num. plant-years 
1. All activism events  2180  - 
a. Manufacturing targets  649  - 
b. Non-manufacturing targets  1531  - 
2. Matched to Census data with TFP  305  6561 
a. Manufacturing targets  275  6028 
b. Non-manufacturing targets  30  533 
 
Panel B: Hedge Fund Activism Events Matched to Census Data by Decade 
Decade  Census-matched  Num. plant-years  All events 
1990s 126  2685  956 
2000s 179  3876  1224 
Total 305  6561  2180 
 
Panel C: Summary of Activism Events by Stated Goals from 2001 to 2007 














1.  General  107 59.8%  N/A  646 52.8%  N/A 
2. Capital Structure  24  13.4%  50.0%  162  13.2%  52.5% 
3. Business Strategy  31  17.3%  48.4%  206  16.8%  51.9% 
4. Sales of Target  31  17.3%  48.4%  254  20.8%  54.3% 
5.  Governance  47  26.3% 53.2%  333 27.2% 60.7% 
Specific – Sum [2 to 5]  72  40.2%  50.0%  578  47.2%  53.6% 




Table 2: Summary Statistics on Plant Observations from the CMF and ASM Sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the plant-year observations targeted by activists (column 
“Targets”)  and all plant-year observations used in the analysis (column “Universe”) from the CMF and 
ASM databases for the period 1991-2007. We require each observation in both samples to have all 
variables necessary to compute total factor productivity (TFP). “Total value of shipments” is TVS in the 
CMF and ASM databases and a measure of sales from plants in million dollars; “Capital stock” is the sum 
of real net stock of equipment and structures in 2005 constant million dollars. It is constructed using a 
perpetual inventory formula following the procedure described in Appendix A; “Total wage” is the sum 
of wages for production and non-production workers in thousand dollars; “Total employees” is the 
number of total employees; “Average wage” is computed as total wage divided by total employees; 
“Wage per hour (production workers) is total production worker wage divided by total production hour; 
“Plants per segment” is the number of plants in a given industry segment (defined at the three-digit SIC 
level) of a given firm; “Plants per firm” is the total number of plants of a given firm; “Plant age” is the 
number of years since a plant first appears in the CMF or ASM database; “TFP (Standardized)” is total 
factor productivity computed by estimating a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function by three-digit 
SIC industry and year, divided by its within-industry standard deviation; “Operating margin” is defined as 
(output – labor costs – material costs) / output; “HHI (Census)” is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
computed at the three-digit SIC level using all observations with positive total value of shipments in the 
ASM database. “Num. industries (SIC3)” is the number of three-digit SIC industries represented in the 
sample; “Observations” is the number of plant or firm observations. 
 
        Mean STD Mean STD 
      Targets  Universe 
Total value of shipment ($m)  93.46  237.95  73.13  323.54 
Capital stock ($m)  44.02  109.52  39.91  198.2 
Total  wage  ($000)  13.72 25.61 10.74 34.94 
Total  employees  291 399 233 555 
Average  wage  ($000)  44.54 14.29 41.07 15.11 
Wage per hour (production 
workers)  18.96 6.79  17.16 6.76 
plants per segment (SIC3)  7.46  9.39  6.24  12.93 
plants  per  firm  17.84 16.73 17.73 32.46 
Plant  age  24.89 7.71  20.21 8.76 
TFP  (Standardized)  0.097  0.94 0.002 0.899 
Operating  margin  0.257 0.278 0.221 0.281 
HHI  (Census)  0.052 0.054  0.04 0.043 
Num. Industries (SIC3)  113  -  134  - 
Observations  (plant-year)  6561 -  633510 - 
Observations (unique plant)  1708  -  99792  - 
Observations  (firm-year)  1085 -  334555 - 




Table 3: Summary Statistics on Firm Observations from the Compustat Sample 
This table presents descriptive statistics on targets of hedge fund activists matched to the Census plant-level data (column “Census Sample”) and 
all target firms (column “All Target Firms”), benchmarked with the full sample of Compustat firms (column “Full Compustat Sample”) for the 
event period 1994-2007. All variables are retrieved from years prior to the event year. “MV” is market capitalization in millions of dollars; “Assets” 
is total book value of assets in millions of dollars; Leverage is defined as debt/(debt + book value of equity); “Cash” is defined as (cash + cash 
equivalents)/assets; “Div Yld %” is dividend yield, defined as (common dividend + preferred dividends)/(market value of common stocks + book 
value of preferred); “q” is defined as (book value of debt + market value of equity)/(book value of debt + book value of equity); “Sales growth” is 
the growth rate of sales over the previous year; “Cash flow” is defined as (net income + depreciation and amortization)/lagged assets; “R&D” is 
R&D scaled by lagged assets; “Firm age” is the number of years since a firm’s first appearance in Compustat; “HHI” is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index of industry competition defined as the industry-level (SIC3) squared sum of firm market shares measured by sales; “Capx %” is capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged assets; “Total Payout Yld %” is defined as the sum of common dividends and common share repurchases, scaled by 
the lagged market capitalization; “CEO Turnover” is equal to one if the name of the current CEO is different than that of previous year’s CEO, and 




 (#obs = 305)    
All Target Firms  
(#obs = 1477)     Full Compustat Sample 
   Mean      Mean   Std     Mean   Std 
MV 828.90  825.23  3330.31  1830.62  6266.27 
Assets 1094.50  1388.72  5789.69  2967.71  11024.99 
Leverage 0.276  0.251  0.256  0.284  0.298 
Cash 0.119  0.182  0.220  0.178  0.230 
DivYld %  1.975  2.301  4.764  2.218  4.350 
q 1.739  2.199  3.954  4.087  10.534 
Sales Growth  0.056  0.201  0.676  0.249  0.748 
Cash flow  0.047  -0.023  0.511  -0.158  0.997 
R&D 0.038  0.051  0.134  0.064  0.176 
Firm Age  NA  12.98  14.15  12.42  13.87 
HHI NA  0.15  0.14  0.14  0.14 
Capx %  NA  5.34  6.85  5.64  7.29 
Total Payout Yld %  NA  2.19  4.33  2.17  4.13 
CEO Turnover  NA  0.14  0.35  0.09  0.28 
Altman (Ex. Leverage)  NA     -0.14  3.86     -1.54  5.45  
 
35
Table 4: Hedge Fund Activism and Productivity 
This table examines the impact of hedge fund activism on the productivity of plants owned by target firms 
in each year from two years before to two years after the hedge fund’s intervention. Our measures of 
productivity are standardized total factor productivity (TFP) and operating margin as defined in Table 2. 
“d[t - k]” (“d[t + k]”) is a dummy variable equals to one for k years before (after) activism, and zero 
otherwise. “d[t]” is defined similarly. “log(plants per segment),” “log(plants per firm)” and “Plant age (× 
100)” are defined in Table 2. The unit of observation is the plant in columns 1 and 2, and the firm in 
columns 3 and 4, in which plant-level TFP is aggregated at the firm level using beginning-year capital 
stock as a weight and the number of plants per segment is the average across segments for a given firm. 
Industry fixed effects are excluded (included) when the dependent variable is TFP (Operating margin) 
given that our computation of TFP already accounts for industry fixed effects. Year fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for sample clustering at the plant 
(firm) level are reported below the coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 2 (columns 3 and 4). 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Unit Plant  Plant  Firm  Firm 
Dep. Var.  TFP  Op margin  TFP  Op margin 
d[t-2] 0.074  0.008  0.106  0.032 
2.92  1.04  1.91 1.91 
d[t-1] 0.042  -0.005  0.070  0.023 
1.62 -0.68 1.40 1.42 
d[t] 0.041  0.000  -0.005  0.024 
1.49 0.07 -0.11  1.62 
d[t+1] 0.032  0.002  0.003  0.015 
0.98 0.21 0.05 0.81 
d[t+2] 0.096  0.009  0.096  0.041 
2.82  0.95 1.42 1.99 
log(plant per segment)  -0.001  0.002  -0.017  -0.011 
-0.26 1.54 -1.23  -2.52 
log(plant per firm)  0.057  0.008  0.069  0.021 
19.53 8.74  7.08 6.51 
Plant age (x100)  -0.700  -0.027  -0.544  -0.014 
-20.66 -2.94 -14.44 -1.37 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  N  Y  N  Y 
Observations 633510  633510  334631  334631 
R2 1.19%  13.24%  0.36%  15.27% 
d[t+1]  –  d[t-1]  -0.010 0.007 -0.068  -0.009 
0.35 0.79 1.42 0.46 
d[t+2] – d[t]  0.056  0.009  0.101  0.017 
1.78  0.93  1.72  0.89 
d[t+2] – d[t-1]  0.055  0.014  0.026  0.018 
   1.65  1.35 0.41 0.82 
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Table 5: Hedge Fund Activism, Product Market Competition, and Productivity 
This table presents the interactive effect of hedge fund activism with product market competition on the 
productivity and profitability of plants owned by target firms in each year from the two years before to 
two years after the hedge fund’s intervention. Our measure of product market competition is the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) defined in Table 2 lagged by one year relative to the dependent 
variable. TFP is estimated using the specification described in Table 2 and operating margin is defined as 
in Table 2. All other independent variables are defined in Table 4. Industry fixed effects are excluded 
(included) when the dependent variable is TFP (Operating margin) given that our computation of TFP 
already accounts for industry fixed effects. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics 
based on standard errors adjusted for sample clustering at the plant level are reported below the 
coefficient estimates. 
 
   (1)  (2) 
Unit Plant  Plant 
Dep. Var.  TFP  Op margin 
d[t-2] 0.119  0.004 
3.43  0.36 
d[t-1] 0.038  -0.026 
1.04  -2.58 
d[t] 0.051  -0.023 
1.35  -2.47 
d[t+1] 0.062  -0.013 
1.38 -1.21 
d[t+2] 0.151  -0.013 
3.19  -1.00 
d[t-2] ×  HHI  -0.880  0.097 
-1.75  0.57 
d[t-1] × HHI  0.091  0.426 
0.16  2.86 
d[t] × HHI  -0.184  0.472 
-0.34  3.77 
d[t+1] × HHI  -0.501  0.251 
-0.83 1.55 
d[t+2] × HHI  -0.893  0.365 
-1.38  2.04 
HHI -0.187  0.404 
-3.45 9.55 
log(plant per segment)  -0.001  0.002 
-0.28 1.45 
log(plant per firm)  0.058  0.008 
19.67 8.75 
Plant age (×100)  -0.698  -0.027 
-20.58 -2.92 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  N  N 
Observations 633510  633510  
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R2 1.20%  13.28% 
d[t+1] – d[t-1]  0.024  0.013 
0.61 1.14 
d[t+2] – d[t]  0.100  0.010 
2.24  0.78 
d[t+2] – d[t-1]  0.113  0.013 
   2.42  0.92 
(d[t+1] – d[t-1]) × HHI  -0.592  -0.175 
1.20 1.16 
(d[t+2] – d[t]) × HHI  -0.708  -0.107 
1.27 0.65 
(d[t+2] – d[t-1]) × HHI  -0.983  -0.060 
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Table 6: Hedge Fund Activism and Productivity of Industry Peers 
This table presents the effects of hedge fund activism on changes in productivity from one year before to 
two years after the intervention for plants that are in the target firms’ industries but not directly targeted 
by an activist hedge fund (i.e., “non-target industry peers”). The unit of observation is the three-digit SIC 
industry, excluding plants targeted by activist hedge funds in a given year. TFP is estimated using the 
specification described in Table 2 at the three-digit SIC industry level. Operating margin and the HHI are 
defined in Table 2. “Target share” is the share of output commanded by activists’ target plants in a given 
industry one year prior to activism, and hence is a measure of targeting intensity of the industry. Other 
control variables are computed based on the industry-level means of the control variables defined in Table 
4. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics based on standard errors 
adjusted for sample clustering at the industry level are reported below the coefficient estimates. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unit  SIC3 industry  SIC3 industry SIC3  industry SIC3 industry 
Dep. Var.  d(TFP) (t-1 to t+2)  d(TFP) (t-1 to t+2) 
d(Op margin) 
 (t-1 to t+2) 
d(Op margin) 
 (t-1 to t+2) 
Target share  0.078  1.238  -0.008  0.114 
0.20  2.29  -0.15 1.26 
Target share × HHI  -  -18.232  -  -2.063 
-  -2.01  -  -1.67 
HHI -  -0.998  -  -0.265 
-  -1.82  -  -2.57 
log(mean plants per segment)  -0.013  -0.002  -0.007  -0.004 
-0.14 -0.02 -0.45 -0.27 
log(mean plants per firm)  -0.085  -0.092  -0.019  -0.021 
-0.90 -0.99 -0.92 -1.01 
Mean plant age (× 100)  2.774  2.809  0.286  0.291 
0.99 1.00 0.65 0.69 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry  fixed  effects  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  1603 1603 1603 1603 
R2  14.68% 15.79% 25.22% 27.16% 
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Table 7: Robustness Check 
Panels A and B examine the robustness of baseline results in Tables 4 and 5 to an alternative production 
functional form and measures of product market competition, respectively. Specifically, in Panel A we 
use a translog production function which allows second-order terms of inputs and interactions between 
them to estimate TFP. In Panel B, we use a Cobb-Douglas production functional form as in Tables 4 and 
5. “High HHI dummy” is equal to one if the HHI of an industry is larger than the 75
th percentile, and zero 
otherwise. “HHI (FF48)” is the HHI computed using firm-level total value of shipments based on the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification; “Net profit margin” is industry-level net profit margin defined as 
(output – labor costs – material costs) / output. Operating margin is defined as in Table 2. All other 
independent variables are defined in Table 4. Panel C examines the robustness of results in Table 6 
regarding the effect of activism on non-target industry peers using alternative measures of industry 
competition. In Panels A and B, industry fixed effects are excluded given that our computation of TFP 
already accounts for industry fixed effects. In Panel C, industry fixed effects are included. Year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for sample clustering 
at the plant (industry) level are reported below the coefficient estimates in Panel A (Panel B). 
 
Panel A: Alternative Form of Production Function 
   (1)  (2) 
Unit Plant  Plant 
Production func.  Translog  Translog 
Dep. Var.  TFP  TFP 
d[t-2] 0.067  0.072 
2.61 2.08 
d[t-1] 0.020  -0.006 
0.78 -0.17 
d[t] 0.004  0.014 
0.15 0.39 
d[t+1] 0.002  -0.011 
0.08 -0.24 
d[t+2] 0.066  0.083 
1.86 1.67 
d[t-2] × HHI  -  -0.188 
- -0.19 
d[t-1] × HHI  -  0.445 
- 0.44 
d[t] × HHI  -  -0.235 
- -0.23 
d[t+1] × HHI  -  0.249 
- 0.25 
d[t+2] × HHI  -  -0.265 
- -0.27 
HHI -  -0.113 
- -0.11 
log(plant per segment)  0.000  0.011 
-0.03  2.47  
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log(plant per firm)  0.045  0.048 
15.51 15.76 
Plant age (×100)  -0.474  -0.457 
-14.21 -13.46 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  N  N 
Observations 633510  633510 
R2 0.71%  0.85% 
d[t+1] – d[t-1]  -0.018  -0.005 
0.59 0.10 
d[t+2] – d[t]  0.062  0.069 
1.91  1.46 
d[t+2] – d[t-1]  0.046  0.089 
   1.31  1.82 
(d[t+1] – d[t-1]) × HHI  -  -0.196 
- 0.32 
(d[t+2] – d[t]) × HHI  -  -0.031 
- 0.00 
(d[t+2] – d[t-1]) × HHI  -  -0.710 
   -  1.12 
 
Panel B: Alternative Measures of Product Market Competition - Plants 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Unit Plant  Plant  Plant 
Concentration measure  High HHI dummy  HHI (FF48)  Net profit margin 
Dep. Var.  TFP  TFP  TFP 
d[t-2] 0.113  0.101  0.191 
4.08 3.25  2.58 
d[t-1] 0.058  0.046  0.164 
1.99  1.47  2.02 
d[t] 0.058  0.060  0.125 
1.90 1.84  1.46 
d[t+1] 0.073  0.050  0.304 
1.95  1.31  2.97 
d[t+2] 0.146  0.131  0.370 
3.70 3.20  3.38 
d[t-2] × Concentration  -0.058  -1.093  -0.396 
-1.00 -1.50  -1.70 
d[t-1] × Concentration  -0.008  -0.167  -0.406 
-0.14 -0.24  -1.59 
d[t] × Concentration  -0.017  -0.687  -0.278 
-0.29 -1.04  -1.05 
d[t+1] × Concentration  -0.071  -0.606  -0.911 
-1.17 -0.78  -2.81 
d[t+2] × Concentration  -0.015  -1.143  -0.917 
-0.22 -1.32  -2.62 
Concentration -0.014  -0.172  -0.018 
-2.27 -2.21  -0.74 
log(plant per segment)  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
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-0.28 -0.28  -0.22 
log(plant per firm)  0.057  0.057  0.057 
19.59 19.59  19.50 
Plant age (×100)  -0.699  -0.700  -0.700 
-20.62 -20.66  -20.66 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  N  N  N 
Observations 633510  633510  633510 
R2 1.20%  1.19%  1.19% 
d[t+1] – d[t-1]  0.016  0.004  0.139 
0.46 0.10  1.40 
d[t+2] – d[t]  0.088  0.071  0.245 
2.37 1.85  2.44 
d[t+2] – d[t-1]  0.088  0.085  0.206 
   2.30 2.10  1.90 
(d[t+1] – d[t-1]) x Concentration  -0.063  -0.440  -0.505 
1.06 0.68  1.62 
(d[t+2] – d[t]) x Concentration  0.002  -0.456  -0.639 
0.00 0.67  1.98 
(d[t+2] – d[t-1]) x Concentration  -0.007  -0.976  -0.511 
   0.10  1.31  1.47 
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Panel C: Alternative Measures of Product Market Competition – Industries 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Unit Plant  Plant  Plant  Plant 
Concentration measure  High HHI dummy  Net profit margin  High HHI dummy  Net profit margin 
Dep. Var.  TFP  TFP  Op margin  Op margin 
Target share  0.493  -0.493  0.062  0.003 
1.73  -0.36 1.05 0.01 
Target share × Concentration  -0.962  1.919  -0.163  0.018 
-1.84  0.54  -2.04  0.03 
Concentration -0.035  -1.786  -0.005  -0.443 
-0.78  -1.81  -0.59  -2.03 
Mean log(plants per segment)  -0.016  -0.039  -0.007  -0.013 
-0.18 -0.49 -0.49 -1.05 
Mean log(plants per firm)  -0.083  -0.041  -0.019  -0.009 
-0.88 -0.49 -0.91 -0.52 
Mean plant age (× 100)  2.747  3.196  0.282  0.389 
0.97 1.15 0.64 0.87 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 1603  1603  1603  1603 
R2 14.78%  23.68%  25.29%  40.02% 
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Table 8: Ownership Changes of Plants and Performance of Plants Sold After Activism 
Panel A shows the productivity pattern of plants owned by target firms in the year of activism regardless 
of their owners pre- or post-activism. In Panel A, “d[t - k]” (“d[t + k]”) is a dummy variable equal to one 
for k years before (after) the targeting by an activist, and zero otherwise. Panel B shows the productivity 
pattern of plants owned by target firms prior to activism and then sold to other firms within two years 
post-activism. In Panel B, “d[t - k]” (“d[t + k]”) is a dummy variable equals to one for k years before 
(after) the sale of plants, and zero otherwise. “d[t]” is defined similarly. All other independent variables 
are defined as in Table 4. TFP, operating margin and the HHI are defined as in Table 2. Industry fixed 
effects are excluded (included) when the dependent variable is TFP (Operating margin) given that our 
computation of TFP already accounts for industry fixed effects. Year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for sample clustering at the plant level are 
reported below the coefficient estimates. 
 
Panel A: Productivity of Plants Owned by Target in the Year of Intervention 
   (1)  (2) 
Unit Plant  Plant 
Dep. Var.  TFP  Op margin 
d[t-2] 0.124  0.023 
4.65 3.07 
d[t-1] 0.061  0.003 
2.35  0.35 
d[t] 0.043  0.000 
1.58 0.02 
d[t+1] 0.002  -0.010 
0.07 -1.27 
d[t+2] 0.023  -0.003 
0.75 -0.31 
log(plant per segment)  -0.001  0.002 
-0.24 1.55 
log(plant per firm)  0.057  0.008 
19.51 8.72 
Plant age (×100)  -0.700  -0.027 
-20.65 -2.91 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  N  Y 
Observations 633147  633147 
R2 1.19%  13.24% 
d[t+1] – d[t-1]  -0.059  -0.013 
2.44  1.64 
d[t+2] – d[t]  -0.020  -0.003 
0.71 0.35 
d[t+2] – d[t-1]  -0.038  -0.005 
   1.33  0.57 
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Panel B: Productivity of Plants Sold to Other Firms after Activism 
   (1)  (2) 
Sample 1  1 
Unit Plant  Plant 
Dep. Var.  TFP  Op margin 
d[t-2] -0.046  -0.018 
-0.63 -0.83 
d[t-1] -0.156  -0.017 
-2.29  -0.77 
d[t] -0.202  -0.069 
-2.63 -2.86 
d[t+1] -0.149  -0.049 
-1.74  -1.56 
d[t+2] -0.034  0.033 
-0.43 1.20 
log(plant per segment)  -0.001  0.002 
-0.27 1.55 
log(plant per firm)  0.057  0.008 
19.61 8.78 
Plant age (×100)  -0.698  -0.027 
-20.61 -2.89 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  N  Y 
Observations 632802  632802 
R2 1.19%  13.24% 
d[t+1] – d[t-1]  0.007  -0.033 
0.10 1.09 
d[t+2] – d[t]  0.168  0.102 
2.11 3.41 
d[t+2] – d[t-1]  0.121  0.050 
   1.52  1.81 
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Table 9: Survivorship Bias due to Sample Attrition from Compustat 
This table provides estimates of the extent to which firm attrition from the Compustat database induces 
biases in the measurement of the effect of hedge fund activism on target firms’ performance. “Attrition” 
(“Non-attrition”) is a dummy variable equal to one if the target firm that owns a plant disappears (does 
not disappear) from Compustat within two years post-activism, and zero otherwise. All other independent 
variables, and TFP and operating margin are defined in Table 4. Industry fixed effects are excluded 
(included) when the dependent variable is TFP (Operating margin) given that our computation of TFP 
already accounts for industry fixed effects. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics 
based on standard errors adjusted for sample clustering at the plant level are reported below the 
coefficient estimates.  
 
   (1)  (2) 
Unit Plant  Plant 
Dep. Var.  TFP  Op margin 
d[t-2] × Attrition  0.032  0.020 
0.65 1.32 
d[t-1] × Attrition  0.002  -0.008 
0.03 -0.54 
d[t] × Attrition  0.022  0.003 
0.43 0.20 
d[t+1] × Attrition  0.094  0.006 
1.27 0.30 
d[t+2] × Attrition  0.191  0.044 
2.07 1.79 
d[t-2] × Non-attrition  0.089  0.004 
3.07  0.43 
d[t-1] × Non-attrition  0.056  -0.004 
1.94  -0.48 
d[t] × Non-attrition  0.048  -0.001 
1.52 -0.06 
d[t+1] × Non-attrition  0.017  0.001 
0.47 0.08 
d[t+2] × Non-attrition  0.084  0.004 
2.28  0.43 
log(plant per segment)  -0.001  0.002 
-0.27 1.55 
log(plant per firm)  0.057  0.008 
19.53 8.74 
Plant age (×100)  -0.700  -0.027 
-20.66 -2.94 
Year fixed effects  Y  Y 
Industry fixed effects  N  Y 
Observations 633510  633510 
R2 1.19%  13.24% 
(d[t+1] – d[t-1]) × Attrition  0.092  0.014 
1.37 0.69 




(d[t+2] – d[t-1]) × Attrition  0.190  0.052 
   2.10 1.91 
(d[t+1] – d[t-1]) × Non-attrition  -0.040  0.005 
1.25 0.51 
(d[t+2] – d[t]) × Non-attrition  0.036  0.005 
1.09 0.50 
(d[t+2] – d[t-1]) × Non-attrition  0.027  0.009 





Table 10: Time variation in factor exposures around hedge fund activism 
The table reports statistics on time-variation in factor loadings associated with firms targeted by hedge fund activists over the period 2001-2007. In panel A 
we report regression estimates and t-statistics from equal- and value-weighted calendar-time portfolio regressions. The “portfolio holding period,” indicates 
the holding period in months relative to the month of the hedge fund intervention. For example, the portfolio with holding period +1,+12, continually adds 
target firms that have had an activist event in the preceding month and holds these firms through a year after their respective activism events. In Panel B we 
form zero-cost portfolios that are long in target firms and short an industry benchmark portfolio. The benchmark is formed by matching each target firm to 
one of the corresponding Fama and French value-weight industry portfolios. We present results based on both equal- and value-weighting the matched 
industry returns. In Panel C we form zero-cost portfolios that are long in target firms and short an industry and characteristic-based benchmark portfolio. The 
benchmark is formed by first matching each target firm with replacement firms with the same 3-digit SIC code. We retain firms whose market capitalization 
is within 50% of the target firm’s market capitalization. Next, we further narrow down the list of benchmark firms to those whose book-to-market ratio within 
25% of the target firm’s book-to-market ratio, measured in the year preceding the hedge fund activism. The last step is to value weight the remaining firm 
returns. Results are presented based on both equal- and value-weighting these benchmark returns. “Alpha” is the estimate of the regression intercept. “BETA” 
is the factor loading on the market excess return (the Fama and French RMRF).  “SMB,” “HML,” and “MOM” are the estimates of factor loading on the 
Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, and the Carhart momentum factor, respectively. “R2” is the adjusted R
2 from the regressions and “N” is the 
number of monthly observations. We set a minimum of ten firms per month for all portfolios. 
Panel A: Target firm four-factor model regressions 
  Value-Weight portfolios 
Holding period in months relative to the event-month 
Equal-Weight portfolios 
Holding period in months relative to the event-month 
 -36,-13  -12,-1  +1,+12 +13,+36    -36,-13 -12,-1 +1,+12  +13,+36 
Alpha 
  -1.366     -1.590     -0.192      0.180       -0.053     -0.745     -0.398      0.097  
  -6.229     -4.544     -0.628      0.784       -0.201     -2.828     -1.684      0.417  
BETA 
   1.083      1.066      1.118      1.044        0.895      0.937      1.048      0.984  
  19.118     11.018     13.425     18.331       13.146     12.871     16.267     17.072  
SMB 
   0.616      0.449      0.521      0.467        0.846      0.701      0.723      0.851  
  10.900      4.625      4.569      4.833       12.447      9.600      8.195      8.707  
HML 
   0.203      0.524      0.515      0.104        0.266      0.392      0.636      0.158  
   2.928      4.681      4.025      1.135        3.187      4.657      6.428      1.710  
MOM    -0.016     -0.087     -0.022     -0.038       -0.278     -0.281     -0.112     -0.248   
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  -0.432     -1.379     -0.289     -0.844       -6.151     -5.912     -1.886     -5.394  
R2     0.878      0.665      0.786      0.854        0.838      0.823      0.871      0.886  
N   106    94     94    106      106     94     94    106  
 
Panel B: Zero-cost four-factor model regressions. Long target firm and short matched Fama and French Value-Weight 48 industries 
  Value-Weight portfolios  
Holding period in months relative to the event-month    Equal-Weight portfolios  
Holding period in months relative to the event-month 
 -36,-13  -12,-1  +1,+12  +13,+36    -36,-13  -12,-1  +1,+12  +13,+36 
Alpha 
  -1.239     -1.435     -0.164      0.028       -0.132     -0.725     -0.458      0.117  
  -5.495     -4.267     -0.608      0.149       -0.503     -2.904     -1.772      0.479  
BETA 
   0.060     -0.007      0.172     -0.004       -0.152     -0.101      0.087     -0.014  
   1.035     -0.077      2.336     -0.078       -2.251     -1.463      1.233     -0.224  
SMB 
   0.533      0.512      0.339      0.461        0.785      0.717      0.554      0.657  
   9.172      5.488      3.368      5.824       11.613     10.360      5.737      6.376  
HML 
   0.114      0.381      0.416      0.157        0.226      0.264      0.658      0.225  
   1.600      3.541      3.680      2.096        2.724      3.307      6.066      2.306  
MOM 
   0.019     -0.077     -0.028     -0.078       -0.208     -0.154     -0.055     -0.210  
   0.493     -1.268     -0.419     -2.101       -4.629     -3.422     -0.849     -4.321  
R2     49.5      22.0      26.3      34.0        55.9      52.7      43.6      44.8  
N   106    94     94   106      106     94     94   106  
 
Panel C: Zero-cost four-factor model regressions. Long target firms and short industry and size and book-to-market matched portfolio 
  Value-Weight portfolios 
Holding period in months relative to the event-month    Equal-Weight portfolios 
Holding period in months relative to the event-month 
  -36,-13 -12,-1 +1,+12 +13,+36    -36,-13 -12,-1 +1,+12  +13,+36 
Alpha 
  -1.007     -0.885     -0.284      0.252        0.249      0.461     -0.683     -0.209  
  -3.661     -2.491     -0.946      0.947        1.068      1.804     -2.891     -1.003  
BETA     0.053     -0.066      0.083      0.097       -0.117     -0.097     -0.025      0.012   
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   0.738     -0.671      1.009      1.481       -1.928     -1.377     -0.393      0.239  
SMB 
   0.095      0.129     -0.082     -0.130       -0.055      0.028     -0.161     -0.041  
   1.351      1.240     -0.734     -1.154       -0.917      0.373     -1.819     -0.464  
HML 
   0.097      0.468      0.270     -0.002        0.320      0.208      0.439      0.050  
   1.115      4.070      2.094     -0.018        4.347      2.519      4.326      0.610  
MOM 
   0.050     -0.032     -0.035      0.114       -0.109      0.040     -0.063     -0.137  
   1.055     -0.489     -0.470      2.182       -2.721      0.860     -1.059     -3.344  
R2    -0.2      17.0      1.9      1.5        39.6      14.1      16.5      10.5  
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Table 11: Time variation in factor exposures around hedge fund activism conditional on industry competitiveness  
The table reports statistics on time variation in factor loadings associated with hedge fund activism over the period 2001-2007 conditional on the 
competitiveness of the target firm’s industry. Competitiveness is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman (“HHI”) index calculated at the industry 3-digit 
SIC code. An industry is classified as competitive (non-competitive) if its HHI index is lower (higher) than the 25
th percentile of industry HHIs in a given year. 
HHI classifications are lagged by one year. We report regression estimates and t-statistics from equal- and value-weighted calendar-time portfolio regressions 
based on target firms from “competitive” and “non-competitive” industries. Within each panel and weighting scheme we report target firm long only portfolio 
regression results and results in which we long target firm portfolio and short a value-weight portfolio of benchmark firms formed by matching based on 3-
digit SIC code, size and book-to-market ratio. In Panel A we report results for targets in competitive industries whereas in Panel B we report regression 
results for targets in non-competitive industries. The “portfolio holding period,” indicates the holding period in months relative to the month of the hedge fund 
intervention. “Alpha” is the estimate of the regression intercept. “BETA” is the factor loading on the market excess return (the Fama and French RMRF).  
“SMB,” “HML,” and “MOM” are the estimates of factor loading on the Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, and the Carhart momentum factor, 
respectively. “R2” is the adjusted R
2 from the regressions and “N” is the number of monthly observations. We set a minimum of ten firms per month for all 
portfolios. 
 
Panel A: Target firms in competitive industries (low HHI) four-factor model regressions 
  Value-Weight portfolios    Equal-Weight portfolios 
 Long  targets    Long targets, short industry  
and characteristics-matched firms   Long  targets   Long targets, short industry  





























+36  To: 
Alpha 
-1.016 -1.654 0.132  0.324    -0.863    -0.816     0.030     0.221   0.151 -0.366 -0.283 0.076      0.644     0.966    -0.579    -0.247 
-3.195 -3.292 0.373  0.913    -2.436    -1.684     0.079     0.646   0.503 -1.116 -0.970 0.290      2.168     2.911    -2.196    -1.083 
BETA 
1.076 1.064 1.163 1.146     -0.073    -0.127     0.139     0.187    0.973 0.939 1.044 0.982      -0.155    -0.257    -0.021    -0.024 
13.013 7.691 12.015 13.044    -0.785    -0.905     1.338     2.165   12.434 10.412 13.115 15.068    -1.985    -2.679    -0.297    -0.420 
SMB 
0.562 0.593 0.497 0.276      0.087     0.114    -0.246    -0.314    0.857 0.829 0.725 0.881      -0.052     0.164    -0.284    -0.035 
6.873 4.026 3.736 1.848      0.962     0.712    -1.738    -2.070    11.086  8.631 6.630 7.945      -0.684     1.489    -2.902    -0.355 
HML 
-0.049  0.416  0.355  -0.019      -0.022     0.526     0.283    -0.276    0.121  0.117  0.564  -0.002       0.306     0.037     0.478     0.001 




-0.019 -0.075 -0.016 -0.005     0.063    -0.082     0.055     0.071   -0.284 -0.295 -0.236 -0.262    -0.186     0.010    -0.149    -0.152 
-0.340 -0.815 -0.176 -0.071     1.041    -0.925     0.580     1.052   -5.508 -4.905 -3.221 -5.055    -3.644     0.167    -2.275    -3.370 
R2 79.9  52.7  74.2  71.5       0.2      13.2      2.8      6.3     83.2 79.9 83.2 85.7       33.7      7.7      21.3      7.8  
N 105 93 92 104     103     92     91   101     105 93  92 104     104     92     91   103  
 
Panel B: Target firms in non-competitive industries (high HHI) four-factor model regressions 
  Value-Weight portfolios    Equal-Weight portfolios 
 Long  targets    Long targets, short industry 
and characteristics-matched firms   Long  targets   Long targets, short industry 





























+36  To: 
Alpha 
-1.170 -1.407 -0.168 -0.023  -0.823 -1.156 -0.047 -0.317  -0.119 -1.158  0.020  0.163  -0.544 -1.308 -0.344 0.033 
-3.838 -3.608 -0.528 -0.092  -1.593 -2.397 -0.101 -0.753  -0.409 -3.435  0.069  0.495  -1.458 -3.130 -0.676 0.078 
BETA 
1.152 1.083 0.973 0.946    0.269 0.414 0.044 0.116    0.825 0.871 0.888 0.969    0.104 0.101  -0.115  -0.023 
14.446 9.609 11.364 15.339   1.964 3.017 0.298 1.009   10.846 8.939 11.371 11.846   1.051 0.852 -0.710 -0.204 
SMB 
0.525  0.372  0.691  0.600  0.025 -0.090 0.361 -0.079   0.806  0.709  0.799  0.812  0.015 0.256 -0.196 0.238 
6.733  2.900  5.908  5.480  0.192 -0.546 1.903 -0.417    10.843 6.388  7.488  5.604  0.165 1.783 -0.940 1.246 
HML 
0.681  0.755  0.655  0.225    -0.068  0.076  0.092  0.140  0.570  0.712  0.493  0.440    0.106  0.211  0.424  0.055 
7.085  5.892  4.649  2.255    -0.434  0.410  0.377  0.763  6.216  6.431  3.838  3.322    0.945  1.308  1.591  0.310 
MOM 
-0.088 -0.093 -0.264 -0.078   -0.126 0.127 -0.450 0.081  -0.253 -0.158 -0.007 -0.302  0.188 -0.037 0.133 -0.192 
-1.683 -1.287 -3.375 -1.606   -1.513 1.239 -3.975 0.964  -5.100 -2.548 -0.105 -4.680  3.123 -0.419 1.072 -2.333 
R2  74.9 60.3 78.9 83.8    8.7  5.8 20.8 -2.2    75.6 66.9 76.9 81.8    6.5  1.5  4.3  5.4 
N 103 90 90 101    91 78 78 88    103 90 90 101    91 78 78 92 
 
 